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Conditions of di usion of competitiveness clusters’
technologies: a brief theoretical note
B. G. Jean Jacques Iritiéú
July 22, 2015
Abstract
Competitiveness clusters (or innovation clusters) are the focal point of french
new industrial policy. They are based on classical cluster model and its well-
known agglomeration positive externalities and on benefits of cooperation.
After a brief literature review of cluster theory, we focus on the theoretical
conditions under which french innovation clusters can foster production and
di usion of technological innovations. Our critical analysis points out three
non-exhaustive conditions: (i) the capacity to coordinate and to incitate co-
operation in R&D; (ii) the capacity to favor production and technological
knowledge transfer; (iii) the capacity to promote and to keep R&D appro-
priation by cooperating innovators.
Keywords: innovation cluster, coordination, cooperation, installed base, or-
ganisational absorptive capacity, collective appropriation.
JEL classification: O20; O30; R30.
1 Introduction
Since the advent of what is now called the economics of knowledge after the semi-
nal book of Fritz Machlup entitled "The Production and distribution of knowledge
in the United States" published in 1962, research and innovation activities have
become over the years the main factors of growth and competitiveness of firms in
industrialized countries. This is how to face strong international competition and
relocation of its firms in the early 2000s, France has undertaken in 2004 a new
industrial policy based on the model of clusters and using scientific, technological
and organizational innovation. This is the innovation clusters-based industrial
policy called "competitiveness clusters". The basic idea of competitiveness clus-
ters is to promote cooperation between business networks, territories skills and
úInstitut National Polytechnique Félix Houphouët Boigny (INP-HB) and Département Ges-
tion Commerce et Economie Appliquée, BP 1093 Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire. This research
note was carried out during our PhD research at the University of Grenoble and in the Grenoble
applied economics Lab. (UMR GAEL, France). (⇥) jeanjacques.iritie@gmail.fr
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innovation in order to create an innovative environment to strengthen firms com-
petitiveness, employment and growth. Formally, a competitiveness cluster has
been defined as "the combination, on a given territory, of companies, training
centers and public and private research units engaged in a partnership in order to
create synergies around common innovative projects"(Marcon, 2008).
The collaborative R&D projects figure prominently in the new industrial pol-
icy and their funding comes from public funds (Interministerial Unique Fund or
FUI), state agencies (ANR, OSEO) and local authorities. The R&D projects are
seen as a way of structuring cooperation relationship (Dessertine, 2014). Today,
there are 71 active competitiveness clusters in various sectors and especially in
high-tech sectors such as nanotechnology and embedded software, renewable en-
ergy, biotechnology. However since its implementation, competitiveness clusters
raises many questions in scientific communities. One of the first concerns is the
issue of its governance and coordination of di erent actors within the clusters
(Tixier and Castro-Gonçalves, 2008; Défélix et al., 2009; Gomez, 2009; Retour,
2009). Indeed, each competitiveness cluster has its own mode of governance, in
most cases, an association composed of industrial actors, academic and local au-
thorities. This governance involves a positive sum game, a mix of cooperation
and competition between the actors. Thus, how the internal organization of the
clusters are managed to converge towards common projects of actors who are
subject to di erent legal rules and taxes and whose interests are diverse natures
and time horizons. In other words, this goes back to the question of the ability of
competitiveness clusters to generate cooperation between actors. Another issue
closely related to the first is the role of competitiveness clusters in encouraging
production and di usion of technology innovations. Finally and more generally,
in terms of public policy, the new policy raises the question of its role in the
articulation of the public/private research policy and industrial policy. It is thus
clear that the adequate theory of competitiveness clusters is necessary in the sense
that the governance of these clusters depends on both the degree of convergence
of actors towards joint R&D projects and the development of an innovative envi-
ronment capable to incitate, produce and favor sharing and dissemination of new
knowledge.
This paper is a reflection on the question of the di usion of clusters’ tech-
nology innovations. Thus, through a theoretical approach based on a critical
view of the economic literature of clusters, we try to analyze and understand the
conditions in which competitiveness clusters can participate in the creation, de-
velopment of innovative products and processes and their dissemination. For us,
three non-exhaustive conditions are necessary: the ability of comptitiveness clus-
ters to coordinate and foster cooperation between actors, their ability to promote
production and technology transfer and their ability to promote and secure the
appropriation of R&D outputs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In the section 2, we highlight the
theoretical framework of the competitiveness clusters policy. Section 3 is dedicated
to the critical reflection on the conditions in which competitiveness clusters can
serve as a support for the production and di usion of technological innovations.
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Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Cluster-based industrial policies: an overview
It is now well-accepted in the economic literature that innovation is the main driver
of economic growth(Solow, 1956). At firm level, innovation is seen as the price to
stay on the market. However, innovation activity is inherently uncertain, disor-
derly and built from complex systems that often require adequate coordination of
technical knowledge (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). According to neoclassical the-
ory only the market (through prices mechanism and competition) has the ability
to coordinate economic actors for optimal allocation of resources. In the field of
technology, market relationship should therefore encourage involved actors in the
creation and use of new knowledge but also regulate and compensate fluctuations
in supply and demand (Maskell and Lorenzen, 2004). The market coordination
may be sub-optimal in the presence of significant transaction costs related to price
mechanisms. Moreover according to Arrow (1962) the market mechanism results
in sub-optimal allocation of resources of knowledge in the production of innova-
tion. This is explained by the fact that innovation has a public good feature and
its appropriation by innovators remains imperfect. The di culty of appropriation
of the results of R&D reduces incentives to innovate. Therefore, firms under-
invest in research and development even if there is a strong system of intellectual
property.
To encourage R&D activities and boost firms competitiveness and growth,
public policy-makers invest more public funds in supporting privates R&D activ-
ities and promote collaborative research policy through localized and specialized
structures such as clusters. Note that the concept of "cluster" was made famous
by Michael Porter in the 1990s. For Porter (2000), "clusters are geographic con-
centrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, services providers,
firms in related industries, and associated institutions (e.g., universities, standard
agencies, trade associations) in a particular field that compete but also coop-
erate". Today, clusters have become the main strategy of industrial policies in
Europe and elsewhere (Ketels, 2004). They are associated with firms progress
and success in innovation, especially in the field of high technologies (Baptista,
1996). Even OECD uses clusters as the keys of development and growth (Martin
and Sunley, 2003). The EU research and innovation policy gives priority to clus-
ters as strategic policy tools for promoting innovation, increasing competitiveness
and creating employment.
The implementation of competitiveness clusters is based on a dual logic: ag-
glomeration and geographic proximity. In economic literature, we find the origin
of competitiveness clusters in the Marshall’s concept of industrial districts (Mar-
shall, 1920). Indeed Marshall’s observations on the concept of external economies
in localized industries have generated several studies on the benefits of agglomer-
ation and geographic proximity. We learned about that agglomeration is favored
by increasing returns to scale and that it increases the intensity of interactions be-
tween actors co-located (Arthur, 1989; Ketels, 2004), promotes the availability of
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low-costs intermediate inputs and expertises, sharing of common and specialized
infrastructures (Krugman, 1991). The agglomeration and proximity also facilitate
the transfer and acquisition of tacit and complex knowledge between firms and
increase their absorption capacity (Ja e et al., 1993; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). In this sense, a cluster provides a local compet-
itive advantage. Clusters promote the strengthening of the network dynamics of
companies and therefore enable risk sharing and reduction of static and dynamic
uncertainty related to innovation.
In addition to the specificity of competitiveness clusters, note that the defini-
tion of competitiveness clusters policy explicitly consider the influence of historical
trajectories and organizational contexts of local territories on the dynamics of in-
novation. In other words, the configuration of the French innovation clusters is
characterized by the path dependency1 of the host localities. It therefore takes into
account their values, R&D capacity, industry specialization, historical events, in-
stitutional arrangements and means. Thus, because the sectorial specialization in
repeated interactions between actors necessarily involves specific assets, a cluster
theoretically acquires a competitive advantage but is exposed to the phenomenon
of "cluster lock-in", i.e enclosing on itself and so its inability to exchange and
interact with the outside.
Furthermore, several studies covered the shortcomings of clusters. According
to Martin and Sunley (2003) the concept is fuzzy and is simply a politic tool
rather than operational. Baptista (1996) shows that the dynamics of clusters
can be a victim of congestion e ects such as urban congestion, pollution and the
di culty of coordination between actors. This raises the question of the optimal
size or critical mass of competitiveness clusters. In addition, accroding to Giuliani
(2007) and Maskell and Lorenzen (2004), there is a structural di erence between
clusters and business networks. According to the authors, the business networks
are characterized by dense dynamic relationships based on mutual trust, so that
clusters are simple knowledge-sharing networks; Giuliani (2007) empirically shows
that knowledge spillovers only benefit a small number of firms in clusters. So there
is not necessarily conceptual relationship between cluster and potential innovation.
Another limitation of agglomeration is the e ect of competition that could engage
co-located firms to capture the rent and the risk of homogenisation of activities.
3 Technology di usion inside clusters: conditions
The research on the di usion of innovations is abundant in IO’s literature. The
di usion of an innovation is defined as the process by which innovation is trans-
mitted and/or adopted in time by consumers (Rogers, 2003). Several factors may
explain the di usion: supply and demand (Griliches, 1957), trade-o  between ben-
1The idea of the "path dependency" resulted in this sentence taken from Penrose (1959): "the
resources with which a particular firm is accustomed to working will shape the productive services
its management is capable of rendering". This expresses the idea that the performance and firms
trajectories and organizations are largely functions of their particular history and routines they
have accumulated.
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efits and costs of adoption, information and uncertainty on innovation, social and
industrial environment (Geroski, 2000; Hall, 2003) and communication (Rogers,
2003). The factors that explain di usion rate may be endogenous or exogenous.
The endogenous factors are the intrinsic characteristics of the product and in-
novative processes while exogenous factors are those related to the socio-cultural
environment and industrial organization. In this study, we consider a competitive-
ness cluster as an external factor and we are interested in its role as an industrial
organization or a support enabling co-production and di usion of technological
innovations. For us, the ability of the French innovation clusters to facilitate
the production and di usion of technological innovations must obey three non-
exhaustive conditions: (i) its ability to coordinate the actors and stimulate R&D
cooperation, (ii) its ability as industrial organization to produce knowledge and
to facilitate its transfer, (iii) its ability to promote and secure appropriation of
R&D outputs by innovative firms in cooperation.
3.1 Coordination and R&D cooperation
The competitiveness clusters will promote co-production and di usion of new
knowledge if they really generate good strategic interactions and cooperation
between the actors around common projects. However, geographical proximity
aroused by competitiveness clusters does not guarantee the existence of dense
relationships. It does not constitute a necessary coordination support to cooper-
ation between economic agents (Mendez, 2008); it seems rather that geographical
proximity is decisive for the most upstream phases of the production of innova-
tions (Carré et al., 2008). Moreover, unlike most clusters and districts, designing
and structuring of competitiveness clusters have not made spontaneously. The
competitiveness clusters policy was driven by the French State as a new indus-
trial policy; then we can assume that some competitiveness clusters were created
for the sole purpose of responding to the opportunity o ered by the State for the
territories. In this case, it would be called occasional cooperation for the capture
of public funds. But even assuming that the policy is set up according to the real
potential of stakeholders and territories, the network of actors that started mov-
ing inside each competitiveness cluster does not guarantee the quality of relations
between them. So, the role of the cluster in the co-production of knowledge is
either to activate or to strengthen the links between actors who ignore each other.
The co-production of technological knowledge requires a common or conver-
gent vision; hence the importance of the central role of the governance structure as
a coordination and emergence structure of cooperation between actors. According
to Calamel et al. (2012), coordination refers to deliberate and intentional actions
to structure the partnership activities inside the cluster. It therefore requires a
mandatory hierarchic process based on procedures while cooperation rather re-
quires voluntary mutual adjustment. It is therefore for the cluster governance
structure firstly to define common strategies for alignment or convergence of cog-
nitive and technological capabilities and expectations of stakeholders, and also to
bring out collaboratives projects. The issue of governance leads up to the question
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of e ective integration of small and medium enterprises and their role in the choice
of collaborative R&D projects. We note that to promote the dynamic of business
network and the emergence of collaborative R&D projects, clusters often proceed
by fairs of projects (e. g. cluster Minalogic), innovation workshops (e. g. cluster
Techtera), calls for internal projects (e. g. cluster Axelera) or collaborative days.
But all these strategies do not remove the risk of seeing the establishment of a
governance around large dominant firms which impose their rules to dominated
small firms. For instance, Bossard-Prechoux and Brechet (2009) showed that the
process of emergence of collaborative projects is done in several steps and it starts
around a core group of large companies to the peripheries composed mainly of
small businesses. In fact a theoretical analysis of the structure of governance as
a coordination support of cooperation between actors would be necessary to un-
derstand the logic of coordination within the competitiveness clusters. For this
analysis, one could for example build on the work of Olson "The Logic of Col-
lective action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups" published in 1971. The
analysis should be complemented by empirical research on clusters.
In addition to the coordination issue, there is also the issue of cooperation
around common projects. The governance structure should encourage cooperation
relationship between clusters’ members because the actors’ motivation to cooper-
ate is not "natural" but is acquired over time (Calamel et al., 2012). The inter-
firms cooperation not only fits in a logical organization of transactions between
contracting but also in a strategic sense, complementarity of firms for innovation
(Abdessemed, 2001)2. Competitiveness clusters should be the privileged frame-
work of inter-firms cooperation3 inter-firm within the cluster and inter-cluster
cooperation. Firms can not continue to manage knowledge in isolation; they do
not always have all necessary information for implementation of their competitive
strategy and more specifically their technological innovation strategy. So, this im-
plies looking for additional information with other firms and research centers. To
do this, cooperation relationship must be increasingly strengthened and contrac-
tualized. These relationships should involve both large companies and small ones.
Small businesses should be helped and encouraged to be heavily involved to co-
operate and interact. Within clusters, they will enjoy the benefits of cooperation
that can be esteemed in informational terms (i.e. network e ects, spillovers) and
non-informational terms (i.e. share of research costs and risk, high probability of
successful innovation, etc.)4.
2Abdessemed (2001) talks about "transactional approach" of cooperation based on the orga-
nization of transactions and related to asset specificity and "strategic approach" of cooperation
resulting from the interdependence of firms and based on the joint production resources, inno-
vation.
3For instance in the cluster Minalogic in Grenoble, one often distinguishes between two types
of cooperation: outsourcing (asymmetrical relationship) and cooperation properly spoken (asym-
metrical relationship). The cooperation relationship is low contractualized and relatively infor-
mal.
4See for example the work of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Boivin and Vencatachellum
(1998) and Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002).
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3.2 Knowledge production and spillovers
Whatever the model type, the di usion of an innovation is based on the transfer of
information (or new knowledge) from a transmitting source to a receiving entity.
Production and transfer of knowledge are central in the competitiveness clusters
policy. The clusters will get local competitive advantage in the ease with which
they allow the transfer and acquisition of knowledge especially tacit knowledge
between co-located firms. Indeed, this form of knowledge is supposed spatially less
mobile and the dissemination of related technology is possible through personal
contacts and by word-of-mouth (Maskell and Malmerg, 1999). This was showed
by Geroski (2000) et Rogers (2003)5. The learning of such technology is through
a regular practice. Therefore, localized activities facilitate the development of
collective learning process and increase innovations di usion rate. But for that, a
competitiveness cluster must: (i) create an enabling environment and be a kind of
an installed base of innovations through the network of actors in motion, (ii) pro-
mote increase of its organizational absorptive capacity and also boost individual
firms absorptive capacity.
3.2.1 Cluster as an installed base of innovations
The di usion process is often facilitated by the positive network externalities. We
note that there are positive network externalities6 when an innovative product
becomes more valuable for a user with increased number of adopters users for the
same product or compatible products (Tirole, 1988). This e ect can be direct
or indirect when there is an increase in the value of innovation following a large
number of complementary products on the market. A competitiveness clusters,
being composed of networks, can be seen as an "installed base" or a support of
innovations especially when there is a dense network. An installed base measures
the number of sold units and currently in use; it is not to be confused with the
market share that reflects only the sales in a given period. The positive e ect
of network is operated within the competitiveness clusters through the sharing
of knowledge and information. Thus, the clusters can facilitate the coordination
of expectations on the choice of technologies to adopt. Indeed, more a cluster
promotes exchanges, communications and R&D cooperation agreements between
actors, more classical ine ciencies are generated in networks, i.e excess inertia and
excess precipitation7, will be avoided. The competitiveness clusters as installed
bases of innovations through dense networks can act for the establishment of
5According to Geroski (2000), the informational delay for the availability of a new technology
may be the cause of di erences in time adoption. However, it shows that the adoption of
technology can be slower than the di usion of related information. This is a typical example of
"hardware" and "software" highlighted by Rogers (2003). Indeed, even if the source of knowledge
exists and is common (e.g. impersonal manuals), di usion of information (i.e. the software) is
done through a experience of use. The knowledge transfer is done by word of mouth.
6Formally, there are positive network externalities when ˆdi/ˆD≠i(x) > 0 avec D = Di + di,
which represents the total demand.
7These two ine ciencies often pose problems when the time information or reaction are long
or when users have opposing preferences on norms and standards to choose.
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norms and technology standards and encourage firms to make compatible their
innovations in order to promote di usion and adoption.
3.2.2 Cluster as a booster of firms absorptive capacity
The absorptive capacity of a competitiveness cluster as industrial organization can
play an important role in the production and transfer of innovations. The concept
of absorptive capacity was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989). According
to the authors, R&D investments not only serve to generate innovation, but also
to develop and maintain the absorptive capacity. The absorptive capacity of an
organization is its ability to recognize, understand, and exploit the flow of new
information (or spillovers) from other organizations. As defined, the absorptive
capacity defines some "productivity" of spillovers: the bigger it is, the higher the
spillovers have e ect on the organization’s productivity. The development of the
absorptive capacity is by learning. In the case of clusters, it depends on previous
accumulated stock of knowledge, type of technological knowledge and structure
of coordination and internal communication. However, the factors that encourage
organizations to learning are the amount of knowledge to assimilate and exploit
and the di culty of learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Learning is di cult
in an environment that has not accumulated prior knowledge and then becomes
very expensive. However, we can safely state that two specificities of competi-
tiveness clusters promote the strengthening of their absorptive capacity and so
boost individual firms absorptive capacity. First, the dependency of technological
trajectories (or path dependency) that allows learning at low cost and second,
the large number of actors in interaction. Competitiveness clusters are therefore
a "natural" environment conducive to learning, so the di usion and adoption of
innovations. They therefore need to densify the network and the interactions
between firms.
Finally, competitiveness clusters need to diversify their knowledge base to
increase the absorption capacity of individual firms and so limit the e ect of
uncertainty. Indeed, the ease of learning is also a ected by the degree with which
an innovation is related to existing knowledge base. To do this, the structure
of coordination and communication should promote cooperation agreements with
other clusters, other external actors and firms and allow opening outwards.
3.3 Collective appropriation of innovations
The problem of appropriation of research outputs remains a critical issue in in-
novation di usion process. Indeed, the "public good" feature of the information
produced generates opportunistic behavior and low appropriation of innovation.
So to encourage private innovation, instruments of appropriation and privatiza-
tion of gains were designed (i.e. patents and licenses). In addition to these in-
struments there are also other public mechanisms, so-called socialization of costs
mechanisms, such as research laboratories and public funds. The new clusters-
based industrial policy can be located halfway of the two previous mechanisms
(Crampes and Encaoua, 2005). However the collective appropriation of innova-
8
tion in the framework defined by this cluster policy could pose many problems of
governance and regulation. Indeed firms engage in R&D cooperation agreements
because they expect to benefit from the results of research. The di usion of inno-
vation conditioned by R&D activities also depends on the degree of appropriation
of innovation. If the actors are uncertain about the outcome of R&D cooperation
agreements, they will be reluctant to cooperate. The structure of coordination
and communication of competitiveness clusters will therefore facilitate and se-
cure business profits especially for small and medium enterprises. To do this,
competitiveness clusters can integrate outside expertise for training, supports for
actors in negotiations and pre-contract, post-contract procedures, confidentiality
of information, sharing of results procedures, etc.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we tried to understand the conditions under which the policy of
competitiveness clusters can actively participate to production and di usion of
technological innovations. Our critical analysis based on literature review high-
lights three non-exhaustive terms: (i) the ability of competitiveness clusters to
coordinate and stimulate cooperation among stakeholders; here, we noted that the
governance structure of clusters should be investigated and adequately model; it
must reinforce collaboration and cooperation among firms; (ii) the ability of firms
to generate and transfer technological knowledge; to do this, the firms’ network of
clusters can be seen as an installed base of innovations and a support of di usion.
Furthermore competitive clusters are "natural" environments to promote learn-
ing (and technology adoption) and strengthen the absorptive capacity of firms
through technological trajectories. They will also densify the network of actors
that they put in motion; (iii) the last condition is that the ability to promote and
secure the appropriation of R&D outputs by firms who work around collabora-
tives projects. The clusters will assist for training and firms coaching to design
intellectual property.
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